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Abstract
The objective of this paper is to determine the factors
that contribute to electronic commerce fraud. We present
a model that identifies five causes: the incentives of
criminals, the characteristics of victims, the role of
technology, the role of enforcement, and system related
factors. The Internet has lowered the barriers to entry for
criminal enterprises. Victims are unable to determine
which sites are real and which ones are fraudulent and
lack of reporting further facilitates this type of crime. The
lack of enforcement, resulting from inadequate resources
and laws, contributes to the lowering of entry barriers to
fraudulent businesses. An analysis of FTC cases shows
that most crimes are not technologically sophisticated and
that greater awareness and experience with this type of
schemes people will avoid being victimized.

holiday, for example, each of the top five product
categories experienced double digit growth, with videos
and DVDs showing a 46% increase from the previous
[2]
year and apparel a 40% increase .
Electronic commerce does not come without risks. The
new medium has attracted people who engage in
fraudulent activities. The Internet Fraud Complaint Center
(IFCC) of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
reports that Internet crime has been increasing since the
agency began collecting this type of information. From
[3]
2001 to 2002 fraud complaints tripled . Table 1 shows
the number of IFCC reported cases of fraud by category
and by average dollar amount loss.
Table 1: Amount Lost by Fraud Type for
Individuals Reporting Monetary Loss
Type of fraud

Introduction and problem statement
This is an exploratory study that aims to identify the
factors that lead to electronic commerce fraud. Criminal
activity is a multifaceted phenomenon. A framework that
integrates the motivating factors was developed. This
study is composed of two parts. The first presents a model
that is based on research that scholars have done in areas
that are related to electronic commerce fraud. The second
analyzes the suits filed by the U.S. Federal Trade
Commission to map out the crimes and gain a high level
view of the type of crime that are committed on the
Internet.
This paper differs from previous contributions in that it
is the first to explain the problem of electronic commerce
fraud. Existing work on the subject has been primarily
descriptive. A second contribution of this paper is that it
presents a model that integrates all of the factors that
others scholars have identified as causes of crime to
explain incidents of fraud in electronic commerce
transactions. Third, by using Federal Trade Commission
cases filed against perpetrators, the paper presents a map
of crimes based on technical and non-technical factors to
determine the level of sophistication of these offenses.
Electronic commerce has grown rapidly since the early
1990s. According to a report by the Pew Internet and
American Life Project, 65% of Internet users in the U.S.
[1]
have bought products online . This number is likely to
increase as more people become familiar with it and
through broadband penetration. In the Christmas 2003

Auction Fraud
Non-delivery
(mdse
payment)
Credit/debit Card Fraud
Investment Fraud
Business Fraud
Confidence Fraud
Identity Theft
Check Fraud
Nigerian Letter Fraud
Communications Fraud

and

Percentage of
complaints
reporting dollar
loss
87
82

Average
(median) dollar
loss per typical
complaint
$320
$176

62
75
75
58
15
56
<1
36

$120
$570
$220
$1,000
$2,000
$1,100
$3,864
$174

Source: IFFC, Internet Fraud Complaint Center,
Washington, DC, 2003.
In spite of the growing incidents of fraud on the
Internet there is little scholarly work on the issue. Most of
the papers written about the topic have focused on
security related to unauthorized access of a company’s
servers. Surprisingly, fraud related to transactions that
have a presence on the Internet is “low tech.” Contrary to
what one would expect, people who commit these crimes
may not even have sophisticated computer skills.
Similarly, while we would expect victims to be naïve or
uneducated we find that all types of people have been
victims of this type of crime. The purpose of this paper is
thus to determine the factors that lead to electronic
commerce fraud and provide some recommendations to
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minimize it. The research questions that guide this study
are:
•
•
•
•

What are the factors that lead to electronic commerce
fraud? Why does it happen?
In what ways does ICT technology facilitate/inhibit
the problem?
How do victims contribute to the problem?
How sophisticated are these crimes and the victims
they target?

The following sections present the model as well as the
scholarly work that has preceded this research and forms
the basis of the theoretical framework.

Definitions
Electronic commerce fraud is a relatively new
phenomenon but it shares many of the features of
traditional crime. Electronic commerce fraud falls at the
intersection of several types of crime, as shown in
Figure 1.

Figure 1: Antecedents of Electronic
Commerce Crime

Traditional
crime

White-collar
crime
EC
crime

Computer
crime

Elderly
abuse

Like traditional crime, electronic commerce fraud
results from a person engaging in an illegal activity that
causes harm to someone else. The type of individual, as
well as the type of illegal activity and the harm done
determine which types of crimes take place.
Electronic commerce fraud falls at the intersection of
different types of crime. Some electronic commerce
related crimes also listed in the common definitions of
white-collar crime include false claims and statements as
[4]
well as credit and lending institution fraud . Research in
this area has recognized that white-collar crime is not the
exclusive realm of top executives. There are corporations

that set up questionable businesses, forming what Phillip
Schrag has called the “commercial underworld”– “small
and medium-sized firms that operate on the fringes of the
[5]
law” . This is a type of business that normally preys on
vulnerable people who, through pressure tactics and credit
offers, pay for cheap merchandise and home repairs that
are delivered unsatisfactorily if at all. High income
individuals have also fallen prey to this type of scheme. A
common example is to sell a luxury vacation property that
[6]
does not exist .
Electronic commerce can also be associated with
elderly abuse. There are many people take advantage of
vulnerable groups like the elderly, who often suffer from
[7]
physical or mental impairments . To a certain extent the
level of sophistication of computers has led many more
people to become vulnerable in the same way that elderly
people are. Technology is moving at a faster pace than
society is able to learn and a savvy criminal can take
advantage of people’s lack of understanding of these
means to gain at their expense.
Because electronic commerce fraud takes advantage of
technology it is considered an Internet or computer crime.
In the book Fighting Computer Crime, Donn Parker
describes a crime committed by Mike Hansen, a computer
scientist who helped develop a backup system for the wire
transfer function of the Federal Reserve. While he worked
on the project he interviewed several people and became
knowledgeable about the system. He obtained the number
of the interoffice settlement account and the telephone
authorization code. One day he called the international
banking department from a public phone. He wanted to
make a $10.2 million dollar transfer. He provided a wrong
account number, which the clerk corrected, giving him the
correct one, enabling him to successfully transfer the
money to Russalmaz, the Soviet government diamond
brokerage house. He was later caught with the diamonds
in his possession. As Parker describes, many people
would not have considered this a computer crime as only
a telephone was used. Parker nonetheless argues that this
was a computer crime because the perpetrator accessed a
computer terminal without authorization and used his
computer skills, knowledge, and access to gain the
[8]
necessary information . There are thus many electronic
commerce crimes where the computer was not the
instrument to commit the crime but, following Parker’s
logic one could justify them as computer crimes as well.
More recently the United States Department of Justice
lists the following crimes: (1) use of a computer to
facilitate a crime; (2) Internet gambling; (3) cyberstalking
and harassing speech; (4) unlawful conduct on the
Internet; (5) child pornography; and (6) sale of
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[9]

prescription drugs over the Internet
. Electronic
commerce thus is unique as it does not fall into any of the
categories described above.
For the purpose of this study we define electronic
[10]
commerce crime in a similar manner to the OECD
: it
consists of fraudulent and deceptive commercial practices
that cause potential or actual harm to consumers by using
or taking advantage of their vulnerabilities and of
information
technologies.
These
include
misrepresentations of material fact, failing to deliver
products or services that have been paid for, as well as
charging or debiting consumer’s financial, telephone, or
other accounts without authorization.

Theoretical context: pieces of a model
Because of the complexity and extent of criminal
activity most studies in the area focus on a narrow aspect
of the problem. This type of study has provided great
[11]
insight into the minds of the criminals
, the
[7]
vulnerabilities of the victims , the weaknesses of law
[5] [12] [13] [14]
enforcement agencies ,
,
,
, and the role of
[11]
instruments that helped to commit the crime . Given
the narrow focus of these studies there is rarely an effort
to present a systemic view of the problem even tough
many of them have it implied. To our knowledge this is
the first study that focuses on electronic commerce fraud.
It differs from those contributions in that it benefits from
prior work to develop a systemic view of the problem
where each of the parts is considered to be part of the
problem and, if correctly addressed, part of the solution as
well.
This study argues that individuals who engage in
criminal activities regarding electronic transactions have
made economic calculations that are similar to those of a
businessperson. They have identified a profitable segment
and potential customer base. Using the right technology
and outlets they could generate promising income with
little risk or adverse consequence. Taking this business
model approach to electronic commerce crime, the next
five sections present each of the pieces of the model.
The model is composed of four major elements, the
perpetrator, the victim, policing that can prevent fraud,
and the means used to commit illegal acts. We believe that
these four components with their associated factors are
related to each other and combined from yet another
factor that we call systemic feedbacks, which can be
positive or negative. Figure 2 presents each of the four
components with the associated factors. The following
section will explain each of the components in more
detail.

Figure 2: Model of Systemic Effects of Electronic
Commerce Fraud
_
Policing
_

Criminal related
factors

Victims related
factors

+
Means used to
commit the crime

+

The development of the framework benefited from the
use of triangulation as a methodology to help determine
the factors leading to electronic commerce fraud. We
relied on three types of sources. Scholarly work on the
subject for traditional and online fraud to help us identify
generally accepted factors leading to fraud. Aggregate
statistics from the Internet Fraud Complaint Center and
the National Consumers League were a third source of
data. Federal Trade Commission court cases were a fourth
source of data. These involved 301 lawsuits against
people or companies that used the Internet to conduct
illegal activities from 1994 to 2003.
Each of the three researchers independently analyzed
this data. Each developed a framework from the patterns
that they were able to identify in the four sources of data.
The final framework resulted from the combined analysis
of the researchers.

Criminal related factors
A large body of research exists regarding criminals and
the factors that lead them to engage in illegal activities. In
this section we exclude street and violent crimes as the
vast majority of electronic transaction related crimes are
done without physical presence and are not violent in
nature. The factors that lead these individuals to conduct
criminal activities more closely resemble those of whitecollar crimes.
In general academic work, scholars have identified four
main contexts that can explain why people commit
crimes:
1)
biological;
2)
psychological;
3)
sociopsychological; and 4) sociological. Although these
have been used to explain violent crime and street crime,
some of these factors can also be applied to non-violent
criminal activities. Sutherland, the first scholar to identify
the problem of white-collar crime, argued that
psychological factors do not cause this type of crime:
“[t]he criminal behavior of businessmen cannot be
explained by… feeblemindedness or emotional instability.
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We have no reason to think that General Motors has an
inferiority complex or that Aluminum Company of
America has a frustration-aggression complex …”
Sutherland nonetheless argues that personality factors
[15]
cannot be entirely ruled out
. A personality difference
could lead someone to engage in criminal activities while
[5]
another similarly place executive would reject them .
In the book Crime and the Mind Bromberg concludes
from analyzing several of his patients that the personality
traits of white-collar crime are similar to those of a banker
[16]
that was convicted of financial manipulation
. They are
realistic, relatively uncompromising, independent, and
unaware of their strong tendency towards recklessness.
On a deeper level they have a “certain rigidity of character
expressed openly in stubbornness, independence and lack
of compromise. Egocentricity and an unconscious feeling
of omnipotence shown through [their] character
structure.” [5].
Considering that most examples of electronic
commerce crime are related to a business, however bogus,
the individuals behind them have a clear profit motive. As
[17]
was modeled by Deadman and Pyle
criminals,
regardless of other drivers, weigh the forces of reward
against risk. Moreover, people in general may juxtapose
the rewards – the income obtained from carrying out the
crime – they might see from a certain decision against the
risks involved with enacting upon that decision – the costs
of punishment if caught. The criminal expects to be
rewarded for his actions, as is evident from the types of
electronic commerce crime, such as false product sales, a
phony web business, modem hijacking, and false
promises.
Because electronic commerce crimes have a
technological component it is clear that individuals that
that are engaged them it possess some level of technical
understanding. Just as a pickpocket will have some degree
of silence of foot and speed of hand, so will the cyber
criminal have a degree of skill with computers and the
Internet. The criminal’s ability may be in subterfuge,
embedding meta-links in webpages so that searches will
pull up unsolicited ads. The ability may come from
experience with Ponzi schemes such that the criminal is
aware of how to maximize profits while minimizing costs
and thus, exploiting customers to the highest potential. A
simpler level of ability would fall under incorporating
spam emails as another channel to advertise a false
product. Many companies who practiced this type of
illegal business had other channels before using the
Internet. However, the rapid acceptance of email into the
mainstream has given these companies a large market of
ready viewers.

Victim related factors
While there has been considerable research about
criminals less is known about the victims. Studies of
crime have generally focused on victims of violent crime
and less is known about victims of economic transactions.
The limited scholarly work that exists in this area is
related to the difficulty of finding the victims. in many
cases the victims of organizational crimes do not know
[5]
that they have been victimized in the first place . They
also do not know where to direct complaints when they
discover a problem. In this respect Coleman writes: “
people who eat food with carcinogenic ingredients, buy
short-weighted products, or breathe contaminated air
seldom know with any degree of certainty that they have
been the victims of a crime. Still, the regulatory agencies
receive a large volume of complaints from business,
special-interest groups, and the general public. The
problem is that those complaints tend to be concentrated
in few narrow areas where the harm is most obvious…”
[5]
.
Although he was referring to white-collar crimes, the
situation is similar for electronic transactions. There are
many products of questionable quality that are sold on the
Internet. For example the American Urological Clinic
marketed Viagara-like products for $39.45. These
included products under the names Alpostaglandin®, The
Celldanaphil-pc System, Prosta-Gen®, Väegra®, and
Urophil. They claimed that their products had been
developed by legitimate medical enterprises and that they
had a 68 to 94 percent chance of eliminating impotence
[18]
. Similarly the American College For Advancement in
Medicine promoted online its non-surgical EDTA
“chelation therapy” which they claimed was effective in
[19]
the treatment of atherosclerosis . As can be appreciated
from these examples, many of the products that were
offered to consumers on the Internet take advantage of the
inability of consumers to verify claims. Online
transactions thus experience asymmetric information
problems, where the seller possesses more information
about the object to be exchanged than the buyer. As
[20]
Nelson
explains, many products and services possess
“experience” attributes that cannot be evaluated until after
purchase when the person has had the opportunity of
consuming them. This is particularly true when the price
of a good is low enough, the personal cost of doing a
[20]
quality inspection is not justified
.
In a traditional physical setting, as described by Ba and
Pavlov, potential buyers have the opportunity of getting to
know about the quality of a product by “kicking the tires”
[21]
but in an online setting where buyers never meet, this
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is not a real possibility and buyers thus have to rely on
written descriptions and in some cases digital photos of
[22]
the items offered for sale
. Under such circumstances
sellers may be tempted to make inaccurate or incomplete
[21]
descriptions of their online product offerings
.
Individuals that engage in these types of crimes are
taking advantage of the asymmetries in information that
exist in the sale of these products. They benefit from
“practical anonymity,” where the customer knows that the
company has a name and appears to be a legitimate
business but in reality they are unaware of who they really
are and the criminal nature of their business. This is
further aggravated by additional deceiving practices that
they include in the promotion of their products. For
example they take advantage of legitimate products and
associated them with their own illegitimate ones.
SmartScience Laboratories, for example, sold via their
website a product called JointFlex, a series of over the
counter pain creams claimed to contain glocosamine and
chonodroitin sulfate, two legitimate substances, which
when applied topically provided more pain relief, but this
was not true.
The victims of electronic commerce fraud, contrary to
what conventional wisdom would suggest, are not simply
poor, uneducated, physically or mentally impaired
individuals such as the elderly. The Internet and the trust
that people put in websites has enabled some to easily
deceive people at all levels of income and education.
People’s vulnerabilities and concerns provide criminals
with a large pool of potential “customers.” Some have
taken advantage of people’s concern for the environment.
The OneSource Worldwide Network sold on the Internet
and elsewhere the EarthSmart Laundry CD for $80. The
plastic disc that was sent to consumers was purportedly
filled with “structured water” that cleaned as well as
conventional detergents but with much lower
[23]
environmental impact
.
They have taken advantage of people’s charitable
inclinations. The Mentor Network, for example, set up a
pyramid scheme where individuals paid $24 to join and
another $30 a month thereafter for a minimum of one
year. Of that amount they claimed that they sent $7.50 to a
bona fide charitable organization that assists needy
children in foreign countries while $15 was paid to
consumers as recruitment bonuses and promised high
[24]
monthly returns
.
They have taken advantage of people’s medical
concerns by selling all types of products that claim to cure
[25]
Alzheimer’s Disease, and HIV/AIDS
. Others claimed
to mitigated Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder
[26]
(ADHD) , and chronic or degenerative diseases
including multiple sclerosis, emphysema, tuberculosis and
[27]
spinal cancer
.

Individual consumers are not the only ones vulnerable
to the deceptive practices of companies that have
established operations online. Small businesses are also
vulnerable market niches for criminal entrepreneurs. They
have set up operations that claim to offer additional
revenues to small business clients by many products such
as selling free-standing kiosks with accepting cash
designed to allow customers to access the Internet for a
fee. They have given phony references and made
[28]
unreasonable earnings claims
. One offered digital
photo sticker vending machines which also claimed
[29]
unreasonable revenue claims
.
There are also more sophisticated electronic commerce
fraud schemes that use technology in a much more
sophisticated manner. In the late 1990s, for example, a
pornographic website offered its visitors additional free
images if they downloaded a program. When executed the
Audiotex Connection program silenced the speakers,
disconnected the individual from their ISP and connected
them to an international ISP that charged $2 per minute.
As well, an Australian company, Internic Technology,
developed a copy of the legal InterNIC site where it sold
domain names for $250 instead of the $100 charged by
InterNIC. They forwarded the application to Network
[30]
Solutions and kept the difference
.
In the previous section it was stated that electronic
commerce fraud resembled elderly abuse. The trust that
many people put on Internet sites and the inability to
determine if a product is working has made detection
more difficult. Even with full mental abilities, basic
human weaknesses have made common individuals and
small companies vulnerable to the criminal creations of
others.
To add to the complexity and lack of understanding of
the problem many of these crimes are unreported.
According to Shover: “[a] great deal of white-collar crime
goes unreported for the simple season that many of its
victims are unaware they have been victimized. Unlike
robbery, burglary, and other street crimes, acts of whitecollar crime frequently do not stand out in victims’
experiences; they characteristically have the look of
[4]
routine legitimate transactions” . Aside from the
difficulty of recognizing that they have been victims of
crime they also fail to report because they share part of the
responsibility, believing that “they should have been more
careful in the first place, victims often feel a sense of
embarrassment and shame, and prefer that others not learn
[4]
what happened to them” . By understanding this type of
crimes and being aware of the capabilities of technologies
people can begin to recognize and report these crimes.

Policing factors as a deterrent to electronic
commerce crimes
Criminals are influenced by a number of factors
including reward and risk. Many people juxtapose the
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rewards they might see from a certain decision against the
risks involved with acting upon that decision. The
electronic commerce crimes identified here are clearly
subject to this type of calculation. With each crime,
whether it is a false product sale, a phony web business,
modem hijacking, or a other false promise, there are
certain rewards that the criminal can expect to gain from
participating in the crime. There is also a risk of being
caught.
The law determines whether an activity is illegal or not.
White-collar criminals consider law and enforcement is
determining the probability of being caught. People
weighing whether or not to engage in an illegal activity
are likely to have a high probability of being successful.
There are several factors that play in their favor.
First, electronic commerce fraud often falls in grey
areas of the law. For example, the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration does not regulate herbal or natural
products, even when they make unsubstantiated health
claims. It is thus impossible for people to determine the
validity of those claims and it is sometimes debatable
whether the company is committing a crime because they
face no regulatory oversight.
Second, resources to fight these types of crimes are
more limited than those allocated for street and violent
crimes. This is because the organizations in charge of
enforcement, in the case of electronic commerce it is the
Federal Trade Commission, are often regarded as being
too bureaucratic and members of Congress consider self[5]
regulation as the first course of action . Most federal
agencies can only enforce rules through civil or
administrative actions. They can initiate a hearing before
an administrative law judge or file a lawsuit in a civil
court. If they determine that the case warrants criminal
prosecution they can recommend this to the Justice
[5]
Department, which then makes the final decision .
Third, the penalties, which can be effective in deterring
economic crime, are often lenient. Of the electronic
commerce related cases that the Federal Trade
Commission has filed before civil courts and
administrative hearings, the vast majority of sanctions
involve consumer redress, which entails the return of the
funds that were acquired illegitimately. This is generally
done by freezing the assets of the offenders. Other
sanctions include prohibiting defendants from engaging in
this type of illegal activity. In many instances, the case is
settled and rarely does anybody face imprisonment.
Another agency, the Federal Drug Administration, is
limited in its enforcement powers. For example, it cannot
forbid the distribution of a drug just because it has
hazardous side effects as there are many drugs that are

effective in the treatment of serious diseases that have
serious side effects. Similarly the FDA does not test drugs
coming to market. The companies that develop and
manufacture the products instead do these. The Consumer
Product Safety Commission, which is in charge of issuing
regulations with the intention of protecting customers
from unsafe products, is unable to prevent the sale of
dangerous products, the normal course of action is to
[5]
intervene after injuries or deaths have already occurred .
Fourth, government agencies have their budgets
approved by Congress, and thus want to be seen as doing
their job. The pressure to perform combined with limited
resources often causes them to have to decide between
persecuting important but time-consuming cases that
could potentially alienate powerful corporate interests or
pursuing less important claims that will more easily result
in a list of convictions that will impress congressional
[5]
oversight committees .
Fifth, the government has generally ignored whitecollar crimes in favor of more visible street and violent
crimes. Crime control has been at the center of partisan
politics because voters seem to care deeply about this
issue. As Tonry argues “ Critics claim that Republicans
and other conservatives cynically heightened public
anxieties about crime by stressing it relentlessly in
campaigns and legislative chambers and then promised to
assuage those anxieties by promoting harsh penalties.
There is considerable evidence to support this claim.
Heightened political and media attention to crime and
drugs issues nearly always precedes increases in the
percentages of Americans who name crime or drug abuse
[31]
as “America’s most pressing problem”
.
The problems that agencies face make electronic
commerce fraud fall in the outer limits of the law made
which prompted Kedrosky to make an analogy “between
cyberspace and the 19th century frontier “boom town”
where there is little law and unrestrained capitalism reigns
[32]
supreme” . Because of the low probability of being
caught and then relatively mild punishment that these
individuals face, there are great incentives for people to
engage in this type of business.

Means related factors
Many of the crimes that are committed using the
Internet as a tool could have as easily been done through
the phone or mass media outlets. Many of the pyramid
schemes and false product offerings that are appearing on
the Internet have existed in other media for many years.
Ponzi schemes that are becoming so common on the
[33]
Internet have existed for decades . There are several
factors that contribute to the proliferation of these illegal
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businesses. Many of them are related to the inherent
characteristics of the Internet.
First it is an international network where an increasing
number of people are connected. In the United States
where most of the crimes identified by the FTC occur, 128
million people, 64% of the population, have Internet
[34]
access
. Compared to traditional media outlets a
criminal can access a wider portion of the population at a
much reduced price. Even though national television
broadcasting reaches a larger segment of the population,
these “interactions” correspond to short one-way
segments that are available at a relatively high price.
Other media outlets are much more fragmented and most
target local areas. The Internet, in contrast, has a constant
presence at a fraction of the cost. The potential audience is
larger than that of a city. There is also access to an
audience outside of the United States.
Anonymity and practical anonymity are other factors
that contribute to people being defrauded. A growing
number of people are relying on the Internet for
information. While people are aware that not all the
information provided on the Internet is accurate, it is not
easy to distinguish legitimate from illegitimate sources.
Hittle points out that “[i]ronically, anonymous messages
on the Internet are not always false. A study presented at
the 1998 Summer Symposium on Accounting Research
suggested that anonymous forecasts appearing on the
Internet were better predictors of the performance of
technology companies than were the traditional analysts'
forecasts appearing in the electronic First Call Network”
[35]
. Without the public being able to discern between
truthful or deceiving information, many fall prey to the
skills of criminals. It is not surprising that these types of
crimes are often called crimes of trust.
In addition to real anonymity there is also something
that we call practical anonymity. This refers to the
existence of sites that identify themselves with names and
may even provide an address. Even though they provide
this information it is not possible to determine if that
company or organization is legitimate. In the physical
world one can visit the location of the business while on
the Internet finding out whether or not a company is real
will require research that most people do not do. Such
research is often not worth the effort when the price of a
good is low enough than the personal cost of a quality
[20]
inspection exceeds it
.
Software to develop webpages is becoming
increasingly easy to use. People can make sophisticated
and professional looking webpages, which is facilitated by
the ease with which one can obtain an exact copy an entire
[35]
webpage by simply copying the code
.
Grazioli and Jarvenpaa created several fake webpages
as part of a study. Students were not able to distinguish
between legitimate and fake ones. Only eight of the 80
participants in the study successfully identified a

[36]

fraudulent site . An individual unaware of the types of
scams that have been developed on the Internet may not
question the validity of a site with a professional look and
confidently make a transaction.
The lack of face to face contact is another factor that
allows criminals to more easily lull users into believing
suspect claims. The creation of virtual communities, and
the corresponding decrease in the level of participation in
real world communities, may decrease the propensity to
question the plausibility of claims and schemes. Among
perpetrators of fraud, there appears to be a reduction in
impediments to such acts. The ability to deal on a faceless
basis, at the click of button, with individuals throughout
the world, may facilitate misleading and deceitful acts.
This may be the apotheosis of advanced capitalism, where
commodities are exchanged in cyberspace, often for the
mere purpose of exchange or sometimes for nothing at all
[37]
.

Systemic factors
Each of the four factors described above contribute to
electronic commerce fraud on their own, but the
combination of all of them further increases the
probability of an individual engaging in these types of
activities without many risks. The Internet has
substantially reduced barriers to entry for criminals.
Inherent features of the network, such as anonymity and
low costs, make it easy for individuals to defraud others
with little effort. Criminals can set up phony websites as
well as send thousands of e-mails that market bogus
products and services. While the international nature of
the network has facilitated entry, the resources for
enforcement have reduced as well. The size of the
network as well as lack of resources and effective
regulatory tools makes it difficult to prosecute cases. Even
in those circumstances where criminals have been found
and a case against them has been filed, the penalties and
sanctions are often limited to confiscation of what the
illegally obtained. This is not enough to create an
effective deterrent. An analysis of the cases that the FTC
has prosecuted shows that the same types of crime are
repeated over and over again. There are perhaps a few
differences in execution but the basics are same. This
indicates that criminals have found profitable enterprises
and are able to reestablish businesses that take advantage
of the returns that come with lax enforcement, easy to use
technology, and naïve consumers that believe messages
that are professional in appearance. The victims
themselves become another factor in the system that
contributes to the incentives to set up this type of
operation. The victims’ own weaknesses, desperation, and
inability to verify the information further lowers barriers
for the criminal.
In the framework shown in Figure 2, there are two
arrows that come from the victim. One connects to the
enforcement box and the other to the means box. If the
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victim reports the crime then it can enhance the policing
effort and potentially reduce the amount of fraud
committed. If the victim does not report the crime then
this weakness on the part of the victim becomes another
means/tool that the criminal takes advantage of in
committing the crime.

Analysis of crimes
The previous section presented a framework that
identified the causes that contribute to the development of
fraudulent business enterprises. The model helped to
answer three of the four research questions established at
the beginning of this project. The last question
nonetheless remains to be answered. While the model was
able to explain the factors that contribute to electronic
commerce fraud it is necessary to determine the level of
sophistications of these crimes and the technical and nontechnical tools that are used in these activities.
At a conference on cybercrime that took place at the
Yale Law School in March 2004, we conducted informal
interviews to determine if there was data that could be
analyzed for this study. Talks with individuals from
Interpol, government officials from other countries in
charge of cyber crime, and scholars that specialized in the
subject commented that there is little data on Internet
fraud. The reason they provided for this is because it is
difficult to detect and it is commonly not reported [38].
Given the lack of data, the analysis in this section is
based on the list of cases that the Federal Trade
Commission has filed before administrative and civil
courts from 1994 to 2003. These correspond to 301 cases,
of which a sample of 75 was selected at random for
analysis. The number of cases corresponds to a 10
confidence interval at a 95% confidence level. Each of the
cases was scored based on the categories in Table 2.
Once the cases were scored based on this criteria a
series of ratios were created to map the cases based on the
technical and non-technical features of the crime.
The technical ability of the criminal versus the
technical savvy of the victim scores were combined to
create the first ratio. These two components are in
opposition. For every step that the criminal can take to
become more enabled, the victim can take a step to
become less of a victim. By creating a ratio, and placing
the Technical Ability of the Criminal (A) over the
Technical Savvy of the Victim (S), the first electronic
commerce fraud ratio (A/S) is created.
Of the two non-technical scores the first corresponds
with the expected reward versus the perceived risk to the
criminal. Because these two components are at odds in the
cyber criminal’s decision-making, they are placed
together to form the second force ratio. Expected Reward

to the Criminal (Re) is placed over Perceived Risk to the
Criminal (Ri) and thus we have (Re/Ri)
The final electronic commerce fraud force ratio is the
Victim’s Desire for the product or service (D) placed over
the Cost (C) that the victim must pay in order to satisfy
that need. Thus, the ratio is (D/C). Of all the ratios that
were created, the last two pairs are clearly non-technical,
while the first pair is clearly technical. In order to graph
the technical scores against the non-technical, we take the
average of the last two force pairs, thus producing the
following:
Technical Coordinate = (A / S)
Non-technical Coordinate = ((Re / Ri) + (D / C)) / 2
By running this calculation on each score, it is possible
to present the results in a graph that provides a new way
of looking at electronic commerce fraud. 73 cases were
scored using the method described above and have are
plotted in Figure 3 to provide a graphical representation of
the sample of electronic commerce crimes. Please note
that the technical component is on the x-axis and the nontechnical component is on the y-axis
Figure 3: Categorization of Federal Trade
Commission Cases
F ul l d at a ( 73 cases)
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Several of the cases cluster around the coordinate (1.00,
1.00). This point is important because it represents a
balance between each measure. For example, a result of
1.00 in the technical ratio shows that the criminal used a
technological method that was not highly sophisticated
and the victims could have detected it if they had been
more experienced. The criminal might have created a
convincing webpage that caused people to send money to
a false charity. This is a relatively simple demonstration
of technical ability on the part of the criminal, and
involves little savvy on the part of the victim. Thus, both
parties showed the same level of technical skill.
The same can be seen on the non-technical side. A
criminal may believe that he can obtain considerable
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revenues through a particular type of fraud. He must then
consider the risks. Looking at the graph, while still taking
into account the ratios we averaged, it is possible to see
that the risks did not substantially outweigh the rewards.
On the other side of the average, we also see that the level
of desire that victims felt was often close to that of the
costs.
Scores at the coordinate (1.00, 1.00) can be considered
balanced. In concrete terms, we can say that these are
crimes where criminals did not greatly outsmart victims,
rewards were not greatly out of line from risks, and
victims were not coerced into costly deals without
substantial desire on their part.
For the next area that we consider, we move out (0.80 ,
0.80) from the central point. This gives us a region from
0.20 to 1.80, the sector I area in Figure 3. We selected this
area because it provided a natural break for the data. It is
in this region that we find the majority of the crimes and
thus the most common infractions. It should be pointed
out here that, because we scored on a scale of 1 to 5, there
will be no points in the region between 0 and .20.
Within the region of 0.20 through 1.80, we see many
different types of crimes. Many of the crimes in this area
are not far from balanced. The criminal may have enticed
the victim with a pyramid scheme that cost only hundreds
of dollars and promised thousands, or used a fancy
website to persuade the victim to submit private
information. This first level of imbalance demonstrates
that the majority of electronic commerce crimes are
relatively simple. Criminals do not often show a great deal
of technical abilities in the effort of outsmarting victims,
nor do they often take substantial risks without
commensurate reward. The crimes in this sector are thus
not very sophisticated but the criminals have taken some
time to make their operation look professional or
legitimate. Victims in the crimes represented in this sector
do not seem to be technologically savvy and are likely to
fall prey to these schemes.
The second region that we will consider is (.16, .16)
from the central point, and excludes the previous regions.
This is the sector II band in Figure 3. This is once again a
natural break for the data. Here we see crimes where the
balance is further away from normal. An example would
be an adult site that collects visitor information and then
bills that victim without their knowledge or approval.
Here, we see a simple degree of technical ability – the
criminal made a website that collects client information
using cookies stored on the victim’s machine. The victim
is not aware of the crime, and thus could not have
prevented it at the time. Crimes in this area involve a
criminal that has more knowledge of the technology than
the victim. The use of technology nonetheless does not
mean that they are able to more easily deceive an
unsuspecting online customer. In fact the use of the
technology itself led to easier detection after the crime had
been committed. The reward of billing victims without

their knowledge may be great, but the risk is greater. This
is because the victims could see the unsolicited charges on
their credit and debit card statements and take action. Due
to this greater imbalance between the forces, it is difficult
though not impossible to succeed with crimes in this band.
The final region encompasses the rest of the graph and
corresponds to sector III in Figure 3. Crimes in this area
are extremely difficult to execute. They may involve a
known company, thus sparking the highest level of trust
from victim. Such a crime is extremely rare, as few
mainstream companies will engage in obvious criminal
activity. Another example of a red band crime is a chain
letter scheme where victims sent $50 due to a promise that
they would receive $50,000 within three months. Such a
crime can be extremely difficult to achieve because it can
be difficult to convince victims of such ridiculous claims.
Red band crimes are the farthest out of balance and thus,
for the criminal, can be both the most dangerous and the
most profitable. These crimes can also be more harmful to
victims and cause them to lose faith in electronic
commerce.
It is thus not surprising that most instances of electronic
commerce fraud are more subtle and require little
technical sophistication on the part of the criminals.

Conclusion
This paper determined the causes of electronic
commerce fraud. We created a model from the scholarly
work that preceded this study that identifies five causes of
fraud. One of these is a systemic cause that could either
aggravate or alleviate the problem. It is clear that the
Internet has lowered the barriers to entry for criminal
enterprises. At the same time it has provided new tools
and the victims are often not able to determine which sites
are real and which are fraudulent. Criminals prey on
desires and vulnerabilities. The lack of enforcement due to
limitations of law and resources as well as lack of
reporting, contributes to the lowering of barriers for
criminals to enter this type of business. The analysis of
cases shows that, for the most part, these crimes are not
technologically sophisticated.
Greater technological sophistication leaves a traceable
mark. Similarly, the crimes with the greatest profit
potential are also difficult to execute because the claims or
the tools to deceive are also extreme and not easily
believable. This paper supports the view that people are
often unable to determine whether a site or an e-mail is
legitimate. Governments can potentially help to reduce the
instances of E-commerce fraud by raising awareness and
encouraging people to report suspicious types of business.
Because of the difficulty that people have in identifying
these fraudulent sites a web page listing the common
characteristics of these schemes with examples can help
people avoid falling prey to these fraudulent
organizations. Greater enforcement should also contribute
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to increase the costs of the crime and thus minimize this
type of activity.
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Table 2: Coding System
Technical Factors
(Technical) Ability of the Criminal
1
Used an email
2
Used a website
3
4
5

Demonstrated strong use of the web (e.g. complex
website, site spoofing)
Hijacked software (web pages) or created minor
applications
Hijacked hardware or created extensive applications

(Technical) Savvy of the Victim
Unable to resist an unsophisticated method
Unable to resist a convincing email or webpage (not a hijacked webpage) or other
demonstration of simple web ability
Unable to resist a hijacked webpage or spoofed email address or other
demonstration of strong web ability
Unable to resist a hidden, but not invisible act of control or misrepresentation
Unable to resist an invisible web tag, embedded subroutine, or other shadowy
Subterfuge

Non Technical Factors for the Criminal
(Non-Technical) Reward to the Criminal

(Non-Technical) Risk to the Criminal

1

Intangible reward (e.g. pride, bragging rights)

Safe

2
3

Thousands of dollars
Three to tens of thousands of dollars

4

Hundreds of thousands of dollars

Not very obvious crime
Mild misrepresentation of products, services, privacy policy, charges, rewards or
identities
Gross misrepresentation or products, services, privacy policy, charges, rewards
and/or identities
Extremely transparent - the lie will be discovered quickly (e.g. non-delivery)

5
Millions of dollars or more
Non Technical Factors for the Victim
(Non-Technical) Cost to the Victim
1
$0-$9
2
$10-$99
3
$100-$499
4
$500-$4999 and/or repeated cost of up to $99
5
Over $5000 and/or repeated cost of up to $499

(Non-Technical) Desire of the Victim
No desire for product
Little desire – just trying it out
Could benefit from money, service or product
Strong feeling of need for money, service or product
Desperately believe they need the money, service or product
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